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Dedicated to all who have been lost to chemical dependency, all who currently suffer, and all 
who work tirelessly to help find mindful resolution. 
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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines Minnesota’s Health and Human Services legislative committees through 
seven biennia, from 1995 to 2008 to better understand the successes and challenges within the 
current chemical dependency treatment system. Examination is carried out through the use of 
individual and aggregate ideological data. Trends in both median and mean polarization reveal 
the level of partisanship between bodies over time, while standard deviation that of homogeneity. 
Beyond partisanship, three contrasting theories are used to analyze potential legislative strategy. 
Polarization and theory are then used in used conjunction to observe appropriations and policy 
output. Analysis suggests strong relationships between legislation and polarization, homogeneity, 
and the applicable strategic theory. This research proposes that legislative committee 
appointments may indicate and predict a given session’s political climate, strategy, potential 
committee output and its likelihood of passage.  
  
Keywords: chemical dependency treatment, polarization, ideology, partisanship, 
homogeneity, Conditional Party Government theory, Information and Legislative Organizational 
theory, Major Party Cartel theory 
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Revelations in Policy Stability: 
Political Climate, Legislative Strategy, and 
Chemical Dependency Treatment Policy in Minnesota 
1995-2008 
Introduction 
 
 It has been six decades since Minnesota first established itself as an innovator of 
alcohol and drug abuse treatment, a reputation it has renewed on multiple occasions in 
subsequent years. The “Minnesota Model” of chemical dependency (CD) treatment was first 
developed for the chronic inebriate in the state hospital system and was quickly adopted by the 
then-fledgling Hazelden Foundation in 1949 (Willenbring, 2010). This model integrates the 12-
step practice of Alcoholics Anonymous into the treatment environment and today serves as the 
core for more than 90% of all treatment practices in the US (McLellan and Meyers, 2004). In 
response to the growing demand for professionally trained counselors in the late 1960s, 
Minnesota State Junior College in Minneapolis first offered what is now one of the longest 
running addiction counseling degree programs in the country. This program and other curricula 
led the way to graduate degree programs for addiction studies at numerous institutions including 
the University of Minnesota.  
 
E.M. Jellinek promulgated the concept of addiction as disease in 1960, an idea that 
gained the support of counseling professionals and the scientific community. In Minnesota, 
reform advocates urged legislative action regarding alcoholism and addiction, resulting in the 
decriminalization of public intoxication in 1971 and the establishment of the current statewide 
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county-based treatment system in 1973. Early treatment programs were dominantly oriented 
toward the white male demographic but programs aimed at minority populations such as women, 
youth, and Native Americans were initiated in 1976. The Consolidated Chemical Dependency 
Treatment Fund (CCDTF) was legislated in 1986 and soon became recognized as a superior cost-
containing measure ensuring public assistance for low-income citizens requiring CD treatment. 
 
 In recent years there has been a rising tide of challenges to treatment in Minnesota, driven 
by decreasing number of those completing treatment, both in percentage and number, despite 
greater access and utilization of the system than ever before. There is tremendous effort to 
develop adequate theory and practice regarding the physiological, psychological, emotional, 
familial, and social aspects of the circumstance, yet there is a general lack of research in a field 
in which my research shows importance relevance: political science.  
 
With this thesis I explore the political origins of the treatment system to better understand 
current successes and challenges within the system. I propose we consider the system’s 
legislative history and regard the issue more than one of public health; perhaps that politics may 
be as strong a variable in effective treatment as any within the client or counselor. It may be 
uncommon to consider a political relationship to CD treatment, yet as my research shows, there 
are connections between a given political climate and its contemporary legislation. Through the 
consideration of history and the thorough examination of the Health and Human Services 
committees I intend to offer the possibility of predicting future trends, perhaps as a means of 
curbing potential hindrances to treating populations in need. 
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 This thesis begins with an overview of chemical dependency in Minnesota in historic and 
contemporary contexts. “The Changing Current of Minnesota’s Treatment Statistics” discusses 
the personal and social importance of CD treatment, told through statewide statistics from 2006 
to present day. Here I show as there are considerable negative impacts caused by chemical 
dependency, there are indeed numerous, interconnected benefits to its treatment.  
 
Second, “The Political and Legal Foundations” explores social, legal, and political 
landmarks in the management of chemical dependency throughout the twentieth century. The 
state has played a significant role in the classic and contemporary approach to CD treatment, 
both at home and throughout the country, and it is paramount to understand the role the 
legislature has played in this endeavor. Far more than simple legislative storytelling, this section 
examines how seeming conflicting political and social systems and perspectives coordinate to 
resolve crises and create fundamentally stable health and fiscal policy. 
 
Third, “Potential Political Factors in Treatment Policy Stability” reviews the theoretical 
lenses through which my research data has been conducted. The initial examination of my 
research is of ideological polarization, or the level of partisanship between legislative chambers 
and committees, parties and individuals. While polarization is ideal for examining distance 
between parties and bodies, it does little in the way of revealing the rationale behind such 
distance. For a more robust analysis, I have selected three opposing theories on the function of 
legislative committees: Conditional Party Government, which demands party consensus for the 
successful passage of legislation; Informational Theory, in which highly experienced and 
knowledgeable committee members serve only the best interest of the entire legislative chamber, 
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regardless of their party; and the Major Party Cartel theory, by which the majority party 
strategizes a strict legislative agenda and uses its power of committee appointment for best 
implementation.  
 
I will then relate the steps I take to design, research, collect, and analyze my data. In 
“Data Collection, Organization, and Analysis Preparation” I reveal that not only is there a 
connection to the political, but that there are dozens of relationships to consider. Not only is valid 
data collected pertaining to its specific topic, this same data is used to verify and validate 
otherwise seeming unrelated data. Each perspective stands firmly alone, yet when used in 
conjunction its robustness is genuine and formidable. 
 
In the “Analysis,” I discuss each legislative biennium in chronological order, elaborating 
on the most relevant and appropriate data and theories. Median polarization, or the difference of 
midpoints in ideological distribution of two bodies, is the technique that yields usable results in 
each biennium. This measure both supports and is supported by one or more other perspectives, 
whether it is mean polarization, homogeneity, or one of the three theoretical frameworks. I also 
discuss treatment-relevant legislation, specifically that of the health omnibus bills that contain 
appropriations and programmatic changes to CD treatment. 
 
Finally, “Results and Considerations” ties together the seven biennia to reveal the 
relationship between political climate and the policy decisions and legislation created within. As 
the culmination of my research, this section offers an exciting and novel perspective on the 
political origins of CD treatment. In addition to the examination of the analysis results, I offer 
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pertinent considerations regarding the future use of said results in assessing potential legislative 
climates. This section, as with the thesis as a whole, is not intended to offer definitive answers, 
but to serve as a fresh perspective to common challenges. 
 
The Changing Current of Minnesota’s Treatment Statistics 
 
The attention paid to abuse and addiction in Minnesota has been driven by the 
recognition of its vast personal and societal effects. Addiction does not happen in isolation; while 
the potential for addiction may be personal, both the initial and ultimate steps of its process occur 
within society. There are incredible costs to the individual, the family, the economy, and the 
health care and criminal justice systems. Effective treatment services can provide tangible 
savings in all of the areas. 
 
The primary effects of any Substance Use Disorder (SUD) are those imposed on the 
individual and their personal relations. In addition, in Minnesota those who suffer an SUD are 
very likely to suffer an emotional or psychological disorder as well. A 2006 report from the 
University of Minnesota School of Public Health reported 9.1% of the state’s adult population fit 
the criteria for SUD (University of Minnesota, 2006). Currently up to 80% of all SUDs are 
accompanied by a mental health disorder. This statistic reflects the affect on juveniles as well, 
who show a reliance on substance use depending upon the mental illness: psychosis (29% SUD); 
bipolar (19%); intermittent explosive (19%); depression (11%); anxiety (10%). The tendency for 
future use is established in the adolescent years, and those who suffer from high risk of mental 
illness are twice as likely to use alcohol than low-risk adolescents (42% to 21.2%), nearly three 
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times as likely marijuana (22% to 7.6%) as well as tobacco (30% to 9.7%) (Godin, Mostrom, & 
Aby, 2009).  
 
The greatest physical harm one can suffer is of course the loss of one’s life. According to 
the MNDHHS Drug Abuse Trends reports of June 2008 and June 2012, between 2000-2010 
there were 1,190 drug-related deaths in Hennepin County alone: 410 from cocaine use (59 in 
2007); 673 from various opiates (84 in 2008); and 107 from methamphetamines (19 in 2004) 
(Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2008; Minnesota Department of Human Services 
2012). At times the loss of life can be that of an innocent bystander; in the same period as above 
there were 1,945 alcohol-related fatalities on Minnesota roads. The tendency for increased risk-
taking is also a factor in the spread of life-threatening sexually transmitted disease, and between 
2010-2012 14% of Minnesota’s new HIV cases were associated with intravenous drug users 
(Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2013). 
 
 In addition to the personal costs accrued by addiction, there are substantial economic 
burdens on the health care and criminal justice systems. An oft-cited 1998 study by the U.S 
Department of Health and Human Services (USHHS) shows that for every one dollar in 
treatment costs saves seven dollars in the criminal justice system; savings are found through both 
decreased likelihoods for being arrested (16%) and felony conviction (34%) when treatment is 
completed. When savings from the health care system are included (through reduced hospital 
visits and community psychiatric care visits, for example) the single dollar of cost can save 
twelve. In California, every $100,000 spent on treatment results in an annual average health care 
savings of $487,000, and $700,000 in avoided criminal activity. Employers have also been 
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shown to benefit from reduced absenteeism, tardiness, on-site injuries, and disputes, and an 
overall increase in productivity (U.S Department of Health and Human Services, 2009).  
 
Who Is Being Reached? 
Through increased appropriations to the CCDTF, more Minnesotans are entering 
treatment with public funding than ever before, yet the state has long admitted the inability to 
reach the vast majority of those in need. Using HHS population estimates with the 2010 census 
reveals there are 482,657 Minnesota residents who fit SUD criteria. There were 50,124 reported 
treatment admissions in the 2012 Chemical Dependency Provider Performance Measures 
(CDPPM) (all facilities that receive state funding are required to report), meaning 9.6% of those 
in need entered treatment (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2013). Not only is the 
affect of higher admissions diminished when adjusting for overall population growth, it is even 
more so when taking into account 28,069 (56%) completed their program. Total completions in 
2012 were lowest since 2003, when 30,379 successfully completed (66% of 46,029 admissions) 
(Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2008; Minnesota Department of Human Services, 
2013). This is part of a downward trend that began in 2007. 
 
 The stark contrast of admissions to completions is revealed between the earliest available 
CDPPM in 2007 and that of 2012. By 2012 there was an 8% increase in the overall number of 
admissions (46,412 to 50,124) but an identical decrease in completion rates (64% to 56%), for an 
overall loss from 2007 of 1,634 completed programs. In addition, multiple dimensions within the 
National Outcome Measures (NOMS) outpaced the increase in admissions: homeless on 
admission (currently 8.4%); not employed/student on admission (59.9%); drug use in past 30 
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days (41.3%); and no self-help group participation past 30 days (58.6%).  The Summary 
Measure, which indicates the overall percentage change (+/-) in all seven NOMS, fell 4.2% from 
49.5% in 2007 to 45.3% in 2012 (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2008; Minnesota 
Department of Human Services, 2013).  
 
 In the same time period, there were sizable increases in the six Dimensions of Addiction, 
which observe clients with chemical health severity ratings of moderate, serious, or extreme: 
acute intoxication (9% to 14.2%); biomedical conditions and complications (14.8% to 17.1%); 
emotional/behavioral/cognitive problems (55.6% to 72.3%); resistance to change (56.8% to 
70%); relapse/continued use potential (86.6% to 96.2%); and unsupportive recovery environment 
(71.8% to 90.2%). Here the Summary Measure decreased 7.8%, almost twice that of NOMS, 
from 32% to 24.2% (Minnesota Department of Human Services, 2008; Minnesota Department of 
Human Services, 2013). In light of increased admission rates, the above statistics suggest a 
growing complexity for CD treatment, one in which a more focused political consideration may 
be required. If policy has increased access for a socioeconomic demographic, and the conditions 
by which said demographic exists has become more challenging, then policy must reflect those 
challenges as well.  
Political and Legal Foundations of Chemical Dependency Treatment 
  
 In this thesis I argue that treatment stabilization efforts in Minnesota are improved with 
the consideration of the system’s political origins, both historically and contemporarily. Indeed, 
my research reveals a long and complex history, one that involves multiple actors, motivations, 
and stages. The process of change was initially driven by the decriminalization of public 
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intoxication, as public, political, and professional sentiment changed to view chronic inebriation 
not as a punishable offense but a treatable disease. In its history, Minnesota has experienced 
three stages while establishing the current CD treatment system: criminal, transitional, and public 
health. 
 
 The criminal stage of development, defined by the criminal processing of chronic 
inebriates, was between 1899 and 1966, when Minnesota Statute 340.96 prohibited the act of 
public intoxication by the voluntary consumption of intoxicating liquors. Enforcement of this 
statute was carried out by municipal police departments throughout the state who acted 
according to their given charters coordinating ordinances. The statute focused on the chronic 
inebriate and it placed the burden upon local law enforcement of apprehending and housing 
offenders, thereby diverting attention from more severe criminal activity. Hennepin County was 
the first to take a step towards reform in 1966 when it established the Pre-Court Screening 
Committee, which consisted of twelve members from local services familiar with chronic 
inebriation whose responsibility it was to review and recommend drunkenness cases to the 
bench. This was an innovative attempt to assist the skid-row inebriate who would traditionally be 
processed by the courts.  
  
The state’s transitional stage began on May 22, 1967, with the passage of the 
Hospitalization and Commitment Act (Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 253A.01-121, 1971), which provided 
for the voluntary, involuntary, and emergency hospitalization and treatment of the chemically 
dependent and mentally ill, including the chronically intoxicated. This act allowed both peace 
and health officers to transport and admit persons to health service facilities. It passed during a 
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substantial conservative majority in both the House (93-42) and Senate (67-45), and signed by 
Republican governor Harold LeVander.  
 
Although the new statute provided means to direct chronic inebriates toward a more 
healthful resolution, it did not eliminate the contradictory city ordinances by which local law 
enforcement traditionally operated. The conflict between state statute and city charter came to 
light on April 7, 1967, when a Mr. Bernard Fearon was arrested and found guilty in Ramsey 
County of violating § 340.96. The defense unsuccessfully argued the statute did not apply to the 
chronic inebriate, as due to his condition Mr. Fearon could not control his consumption, hence 
the act was not voluntary. When appealing the decision to the Minnesota Supreme Court the 
defense also argued 8th Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment, citing 
passage of the Hospitalization and Commitment Act as indication the state saw chronic 
alcoholism as disease. 
 
The Minnesota Supreme Court decision in State v. Fearon on March 21, 1969, held § 
340.96 did not apply to the chronic inebriate, providing legal support to the disease model of 
chemical dependency. In the opinion by Justice Frank T. Gallagher, the following grounds were 
cited for appeal: 1) § 340.96 applies only to voluntary consumption, and that by the very nature 
of the chronic inebriate consumption is involuntary; 2) A previous US Supreme Court case to 
uphold a similar Texas statute nonetheless revealed substantial doubt regarding the 
constitutionality of such statutes; 3) It follows the evolved opinion of most professionals and 
authorities on the disease model of addiction; 4) The state accepted the disease model of 
addiction, as reflected in the passage of the Hospitalization and Commitment Act. 
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The Supreme Court decision in State v. Fearon strengthened the perception of chemical 
dependency as a public health issue in the eyes of the public and their elected officials alike. The 
Minnesota legislature repealed § 340.96 on March 29, 1971, completely eliminating the criminal 
processing of public intoxication and nullifying any inconsistent local ordinances. In its stead 
was passed Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 245.68 (h)-(k) (Supp. 1977) which mandated each area mental 
health board to establish at least one detoxification center; Hennepin County was to open the 
doors to its first center the day of the bill’s signing. The act was passed during narrow 
conservative majorities in the House (+5) and the Senate (+6) and signed by DFL governor 
Wendell R. Anderson.  
 
With area mental health boards opening detoxification centers across the state, the 
legislature sought to establish administrative, service, and qualification guidelines that are the 
essence of operations today. The Treatment for Alcohol and Drug Abuse Act (Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 254A.01-.07 (Supp. 1972)) was passed during a liberal majority in both House (+20) and 
Senate (+7) and signed by DFL governor Wendell R. Anderson on May 23, 1973. The legislation 
would serve as long-term reform that established a permanent administrative structure for 
statewide operations, expanded services and the classes of individuals eligible for financial 
assistance, and sanctioned the pick-up and transport of public inebriates by civilians to local 
health facilities. It relieved local courts of the criminal processing of the public inebriate, 
improved emergency care, and opened access for resocialization. Reform was possible through 
the coordinated efforts of legislators, civic, legal, and professional leaders, as well as state and 
local commissions. By 1974, Minneapolis would open its second detoxification center, Southside 
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Detox, serving primarily the Native American community. Hennepin County already had plans 
for numerous satellite facilities throughout the county. 
 
 While the chemical dependency program was still very young the 1976 Governor’s Bill, 
from the desk of Wendell R. Anderson initiated yet three more programs, these aimed at more 
unique demographics: the employee assistance programs; youth and other underserved 
populations; and American Indian chemical dependency programs.  Even as the programs and 
initiatives were well intentioned, a report from the Office of the Legislative Auditor, Evaluation 
Report on the State Sponsored Chemical Dependency Programs (February 15, 1979), was 
harshly critical of not only the cost of the Governor’s bill’s programs but also of the 
effectiveness of the chemical dependency service system. The report found issues that are still 
relevant today, namely reaching 10-15% of the total population in need of treatment services, 
and inconsistent service costs around the state. In 1978, the state spent $22,000,000 on chemical 
dependency services, which, when accounting for inflation, is roughly more than the amount the 
state would spend in the 1995-1996 biennium, which is the first time frame analyzed with 
polarization data in this thesis.  
 
 Following the audit of the fledgling chemical dependency division the state responded 
accordingly and in 1986 passed the Chemical Dependency Treatment Act (Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 
254B.01-.14). The focus of the bill was the Consolidate Chemical Dependency Treatment Fund 
(CCDTF), which combines state appropriations and federal grants into a singular funding 
mechanism. Within the CCDTF, centralized funds, client funding eligibility criteria, and service 
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site payment rates would work in concert to improve access to quality and cost-effective CD 
treatment throughout the state.  
 
Eligibility for CCDTF funding, or Rule 25, was originally distributed across the three 
levels, known henceforth as Tier I, Tier II, and Tier III. Tier I was reserved for those who met 
the same income eligibility requirements, or receiving Medical Assistance (MA) benefits, 
General Assistance Medical Care (GAMC), or Minnesota Supplemental Assistance (MSA). Tier 
II eligibility was for those not entitled to the above services but had a family income of 60% or 
less of the state median income. Finally, Tier III was available for those between 60% and 115% 
of the state median income. Entitlement funding was forecast and appropriated through the 
health omnibus bills, and there was no limit to the number of individuals who can access funding 
if eligible. 
 
 The CCDTF currently assists approximately 50% of all Minnesotans admitted into 
treatment, or about 26,000 people every year. In addition to the direct benefit to the individual, 
the CCDTF also offers treatment provider rates to help acquire similar costs across the state. 
Lastly, the CCDTF reserve helps providers that extinguish their yearly allocation early and need 
additional funds. Access to reserves is only possible if the provider is able to maintain their own 
“maintenance of care,” in which they pay a small portion of the overall costs (typically 15-20%). 
  
Despite all other important factors regarding treatment in Minnesota, I chose to focus this 
paper on the appropriations and policy changes to the CCDTF. The program has been the 
primary funding mechanism for thousands of Minnesotans since 1988 and has been the single 
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greatest factor considered for legislative changes affecting CD treatment. My analysis assesses 
the CCDTF within the political climate and strategic context of a given session, and I expect 
CCDTF policy and appropriations to be restricted or progressed in either a partisan or bi-partisan 
climate, respectively. 
Potential Political Factors in Treatment Policy Stability 
 
While Woodrow Wilson’s Congressional Government (1885) is fundamental to 
scholarship on the U.S. congressional committee system, it was Richard Fenno’s theoretical 
framework published in Congressmen in Committee (1973) that brought the potential power the 
committee into modern thought. Developed in the pre-reform era with relatively low 
polarization, or partisanship between parties, Fenno’s theory claims the committee is a means for 
members to achieve reelection, power, and sound public policy. As the reforms of the 1970s 
weakened the power of the committee chairmanship and shifted power to the majority party 
leadership, new theories developed accordingly. These theoretical arguments are modeled on 
congressional behavior, yet by applying them to the Minnesota Health and Human Services 
policy and finance committees I am confident they will offer insight into the political shifts for 
chemical dependency treatment between 1995-2008. I will observe using the following three 
theories, all of which have political validity in Minnesota: Rohde’s Conditional Party 
Government (1991); Krehbiel’s Information and Legislative Organization theory (1991); and 
Cox and McCubbins’ Major Party Cartel theory (1993).  
 
Despite its reputation as a strong liberal state, Minnesota’s legislature had a conservative 
majority in both chambers through most of the 20th century. The House had been under 
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conservative control 31 of 49 sessions, the Senate for 35, and the Governor’s office for 30. 
Without ideological data, might it be safe to conclude this has been a state of relatively low 
polarization? The steps toward decriminalization of public intoxication began under conservative 
majorities in the 1960s and advances in treatment were made under both conservative and liberal 
administrations in the 1970s and 80s. Despite a lack of ideological data, cursory observation of 
health and welfare committee memberships would reveal at least consistently large rosters in the 
twenty years leading up to the period in question in this thesis, which would indicate greater 
opportunity for minority voices to be effectively heard.  
 
There are indications beginning 1995 that partisanship was taking hold of both chambers. 
For instance, it was in this year that policy committees of both chambers were smaller than had 
been in the previous twenty years. The average size of committees decreased, with the House 
from 26 to 19 members and the Senate from 15 to 13. The largest committees in the House from 
1995-2008 were still smaller than any committee during the previous 12 years, and the Senate 
also witnessed four committees with 12 or fewer members. Smaller committee sizes tend to 
favor the majority by reducing the minority’s voice and their ability to influence votes. Another 
potential indicator of partisanship in this period is that substantial changes to treatment policy 
and funding transpired, taking steps unlike those in the past, especially in the 17 years since the 
CCDTF began. Yet which of the three institutional theories, if any, could best explain what 
transpired in the subsequent years? 
 
Rohde’s Conditional Party Government (CPG) asserts that party consensus on a given 
policy is fundamental to its promotion. The theory operates on three principles: sufficient 
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homogeneity within the party; leverage for the party leadership; and party leadership that will 
wield its power. Relative to Minnesota, the primary effect of conditional party government 
would be the increase of committee bills that are more reflective of the majority party as a whole 
(Rohde, 1991).  
 
To ascertain CPG’s legitimacy in terms of my research, the median majority committee 
member must reflect that of the majority party in the chamber. In addition, GPC portends the 
increase of homogeneity across constituent concerns. Majority party unity greatly increases the 
likelihood of a given bill’s passage, which in turn results in constituent satisfaction. Given the 
nature of treatment funding in Minnesota, and the tendency toward support or refusal of public 
funding as per party, CPG can be an effective tool for either party to accomplish a given goal. 
  
Krehbiel’s Information and Legislative Organization theory (ILO) also relies 
homogeneity, yet committees function to move bills that best serve the jurisdiction of the 
committee and thus the whole legislature, not the preference of a singular committee member or 
party. For MPC theory to be valid members must be experts in their jurisdiction, can be flexible 
and comfortable with a wide array of political theory and behavior, and recognize the goal is 
never about individual needs (Krehbiel, 1991). 
 
 Krehbiel’s theory has the greatest ability to build strong bi-partisan coalitions 
within the committee or across the chamber. With a coalition it is more likely that a given bill’s 
effect will have greater longevity due the support and familiarity of the legislature moving 
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forward. It is more likely to find this theory applied in times of relatively low polarization, where 
cooperation is most favored. 
 
 Cox and McCubbins’ Major Party Cartel theory (MPC) claims that a party in the 
majority will use its power to develop a legislative cartel, thus producing an environment that 
perpetuates it’s own power (Cox & McCubbins, 1993). Through the committee system this is 
accomplished by strategic placement of committee chairs and other members willing to pass bills 
that are best for the majority party, perhaps most of all the leadership, at the expense of others. 
The advantage of the majority party in part lies in controlling the legislative agenda from the 
earliest stages of the committee all the way through to the chamber floor (Cox & McCubbins, 
1993). 
 
 While MPC requires great strategizing and organization, it is quite easy to implement 
when the majority is out of proportion. As policy outliers have the potential to derail efforts to 
drive legislation, the greater the majority the more likely it is that a bill can pass without 
disruption. In addition, MPC can be used to facilitate the stoppage of legislation as well, and 
stopping a bill in committee, before it reaches the floor, can drive the success of the majority 
party. 
 
 In terms of Minnesota’s chemical dependency policy and appropriations, I expect each 
theory to produce substantially different legislation. As the most cooperative of the three 
theories, ILO would produce legislation that works in the best interests of the treatment system 
and both parties, thus guaranteeing a substantial, if not unanimous affirmative vote. Whether 
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CPG is beneficial to treatment policy is dependent upon the party in which it is used, whether the 
consensus in a given year acknowledges treatment as a necessary and important function of 
government. Lastly, strong treatment policy within MPC theory is entirely dependent upon the 
propensity for party leadership to adhere to the principals of social spending or strict fiscal 
conservatism.  
Data Collection, Organization, and Analysis Preparation 
 
 Data collection strategy is under constant development, and with almost every collection 
and analysis yet another new and different perspective comes forward that warrants 
consideration. Ultimately, the total amount of data offers the ability to view polarization in as 
many as two dozen perspectives (available in the appendices), from those which stand on their 
own validity to those whose presence adds robustness to separate sets of information. It is not 
enough to simply gather and dissect ideological scores, although this is a fundamental step. I also 
need to include policy and financial legislation, as well as the legislature’s foundational role 
through bills and acts. 
 
 In Spring 2012, Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty released a comprehensive collection of 
ideological scores for state legislatures from 1993-2011. The available data for Minnesota is 
limited in breadth from 1995-2008 yet it provides a depth of analytic points for both chambers as 
well as for individual legislators per session. In total, I am able to assemble two-dozen sets of 
data per session to reveal various levels of polarization and homogeneity within chambers, 
committees, and parties. There are three aspects under consideration throughout my analysis: the 
absolute difference in median ideological scores, or the difference between median scores as per 
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party, committee, and chamber; the distance in mean, or average ideological scores as per party, 
committee, and chamber; and the standard deviation from the mean ideological score, or the 
level of homogeneity, as per party, committee, and chamber. By using these in conjunction with 
the three theoretical frameworks (discussed above) I am able to ascertain the climate and strategy 
of a given session. 
 
 Next, I examine committee membership for each of the House Health and Human 
Services (HHS) policy committees and finance subcommittees, as well as the Senate HHS policy 
committees and finance subcommittees (or the equivalently titled committee/subcommittee of 
the given session) from 1995-2008. To give context to the quantity of members per committee 
for the era I also collect committee membership going back to 1975 (this data is for comparing 
committee size and has no bearing on actual polarization trends as per Shor-McCarty.) Using the 
Shor-McCarty individual legislative data sets I assign the relevant ideological score to every 
member, committee, subcommittee, and session. I am then able to calculate distances, 
differences, and standard deviations between parties and the body as a whole for each committee 
and session. I also take special note to identify committee chairperson score. As with the 
chamber and national data points above, I use the individual-level data to construct committee-
level trend lines over time from 1995-2008.  
 
I then select all legislation affecting treatment services signed by the governor from 
1995-2008. The Minnesota state legislature website’s bill search function is of utmost usefulness 
in this endeavor, although state, county, and professional service reports are integral in further 
identifying bill numbers and dates of importance. Of particular interest are the health services 
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omnibus bills as they contain funding allocations, eligibility criteria, programmatic changes, and 
service site rate levels, for example. In addition to the content of such bills, I pay special 
attention to the authors, the vote totals at passage in both chambers, and whether the level of 
polarization might predict partisan bill authorship and vote count (higher polarization/more 
partisan authorship/more partisan vote, and vice-versa.) 
 
By itself, appropriation data does not reveal the decision making process, and in the 
absence of committee minutes or any substantial movement between engrossments (if there were 
more than one) I resort to the publications provided by the fiscal analysis offices of both 
chambers. The Senate Fiscal Review is by and large thorough in its explanations of 
appropriations and expenditures, whereas the House provides numerical comparisons between 
appropriations within the House, Senate, and governor’s bills, as well as that of conference 
committee. As a third, and often times more revealing display of the process, reference is made 
to any HHS departmental documentation, especially presentations prepared for the legislature or 
for inter-department/division use.  
 
Analysis Preparation 
 In this thesis I report analysis as per-biennium from 1995-2008 (79th to 85th legislatures) 
via ideological data that best represents the overall political climate in both chamber and 
committee. Most important are the polarization measures by median (the mid-point of 
ideological distribution of each party or body) and means (the average ideological score for each 
party or body), as well as homogeneity or cohesion by standard deviation. In order to validate 
any of the three theoretical frameworks I examine the individual party members in committee in 
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relation to their respective parties in the chamber and the chamber as a whole. I also examine the 
policy decisions and output of each session, as well as legislation for CCDTF appropriations, 
service site rate levels, and policy changes. Appropriations are often dissimilar to actual funding 
levels, and when possible I account for these discrepancies with the addition of supplemental 
bills primarily authored in the second year of the biennium. General data are presented in tables 
for quick and easy assessment, while a wide selection of graphs is available in the Appendix. 
 
 The Shor-McCarty ideological scores for Minnesota are available from 1995-2008, which 
is precisely the era in which substantial changes to CD treatment policy occur, visible not only 
through polarization trends but in committee size and the legislative changes made to CD 
treatment services in Minnesota. Without ideological data before 1995 I can only observe the 
above changes and conclude an overall shift from a more moderate committee in which our 
treatment service was established. The conclusion is drawn upon not only a highly polarized 
legislature relative to its self but also all other states, amongst whom Minnesota ranked ninth 
most polarized legislature in 2008. 
 
Committee Tenure 	  
Tenure is an important consideration, especially within the majority party, as it may help 
reveal appointment strategy by the caucus committee and predict possible environment via 
compatibility with any of the three theoretical frameworks. Each of these theories demands 
specific committee membership. Under the Conditional Party Government (CPG) theory a 
committee membership closely reflects the majority party ideological median, and a party may 
abandon inharmonious incumbency in favor of newly appointed members more willing to act on 
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behalf of the party consensus. A committee within the Information and Legislative Organization 
theory (ILO) theory would reflect the best interests of the committee and that over which it has 
jurisdiction, thus serving the whole legislative body. A committee as such would likely be 
comprised of experienced, moderately ideological incumbents, or adequately knowledgeable and 
suitably moderate members in lieu of available experience. In the Major Party Cartel (MPC) 
theory the majority party leadership appoints committee members by their ready adherence to the 
strict legislative agenda formulated by said leadership. Just as within CPG, the cartel committee 
cannot contain policy outliers that may jeopardize a predictably divisive committee vote.  
 
If three theories necessitate three different committee environments to be valid, can the 
observation of committee membership at the onset of a given session predict policy decisions? 
Neither incumbency nor freshmen status mean little without ideological identity, therefore the 
replacement of an incumbent (necessitated by retirement or loss of elected position) may indicate 
the strategic preference by party leaders via change in ideological score for the appointment (not 
re-appointing an incumbent of course carries its own preference significance.)  
 
Tenure in Minnesota’s Legislative Committees: 1995-2008 	  
Of the 22 members of the DFL-controlled House policy committee in 1995, 12 had 
continued from 1993-1994 (six Republican and six DFL), and 11 of the 1995 membership would 
then remain for three or more consecutive legislative sessions. Also in this membership are 
names that would become very familiar: Boudreau (1995-2004); Bradley (1995-2006); 
Greenfield (1979-1998); Huntley (1993-2008); and Otremba (1995-2008). Committee 
incumbency is used by Republicans to less effect in the latter sessions, but initially it is widely 
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used by both parties, and in 2001, twelve of all sixteen members would be incumbent, with 
multiple members active since the first session: Boudreau (R); Bradley (R); Haas (R); Mulder 
(R); and Otremba (DFL). Of this session, the Republican majority is comprised of nine members, 
eight of whom are incumbents.  
 
The 2002 election gave the House Republicans a 29-seat majority, the largest majority by 
any party in 10 years. In this election 33 incumbents did not seek reelection, and while 10 
incumbents lost their bids for reelection five of these were to members of their own party. This 
transition of majority party, coupled with the largest freshman class in decades will greatly affect 
House committee membership in the following years and by the 2007-2008 biennium 
incumbents will account for only three out of 15 policy and three out of 21 finance appointments. 
 
The House finance subcommittee followed a very similar path as policy, reaching peak 
mid-period with all six members of the Republican majority in 2001 as incumbents, five of 
whom have more than two consecutive years. The policy committee took a rare strategic move 
and controlled fiscal decisions in 2005-2006, a year when both chamber and committee median 
ideology would skyrocket with new committee appointments, perhaps signaling the direction of 
the policy committee should the Republican majority hold. 
 
The Senate committees are under DFL-control for the entirety of the period under 
observation, and while incumbency challenges arise as they do in the House, the effect is felt in 
the Republican minority membership. While majority party incumbency would remain fairly 
strong in Senate policy until 2007-2008, the Republicans would lose all but one incumbent by 
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2005, along with a defection by Sen. Kiscaden to the DFL in mid-2004. This overall pattern is 
repeated in Senate finance where again only one Republican incumbent would remain by 2007-
2008. 
Polarization and the Three Theoretical Frameworks 	  
Polarization trends are invaluable in evaluating congressional behavior, yet in isolation 
they cannot offer the robustness my research requires. Conversely, theoretical frameworks may 
provide insight into strategic value of committee placement, yet they leave open many windows 
for speculation, weakening an otherwise powerful tool. However, when used in conjunction, it is 
possible to explain ideological polarization within a theoretical framework and the theories 
themselves can be validated through ideological data.  
 
 As mentioned earlier, each of the three theories used in this research demand a certain 
behavior from the membership, as well as from the party caucus leadership in its appointment 
decisions. To only know the names and legislative history of committee members limits the 
ability to assign ideological/partisan value, and hence the application of ideological scores is 
necessary. By calculating the membership medians and means of each of the chamber, majority 
party chamber, committee, and majority party committee, as well as the individual scores of the 
House Speaker, Senate Majority Leader, and the committee chairs, it is possible to accurately 
compare ideological similarities between bodies.  
 
 By the proximity in scores between majority party committee membership and party, 
party leadership, or chamber, the theoretical framework is revealed. For example, should the 
majority party committee members fall within .025 points of the majority party chamber median, 
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.05 points of the chamber median, and 1.0 point of the party leadership score, it would be easy to 
assess that Conditional Party Government theory is most applicable in this situation. Further 
information is then used to create an even more robust analysis, for example the consideration of 
committee and chamber vote totals, legislative authorship, and committee tenure as discussed 
above. 
  
 To achieve the above I carry out a dozen calculations for each of the four committees in 
each biennium. The results help to view the polarization trends this research is based upon by 
offering potential strategic rationale behind the changes in trends. More importantly, the 
combination of theory and ideological data may provide for the clearest behavioral explanation 
for policy decisions and the opportunity to develop the foresight for future legislative sessions. 
	  
Defining Partisanship via Ideological Scores 	  
Throughout this paper I have used the following definitions, and continue to do so for the 
analysis:   
0 to 0.499 (-0.499) Moderate partisan 
0.5 to .999 (-0.499) Partisan 
1.0 to 1.499 Strong partisan 
1.5+ Very strong partisan 
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Analysis 
Biennium Summaries 
1995-1996: 79th legislature   Minnesota’s	  79th	  session	  serves	  as	  the	  analytic	  baseline	  as	  it	  is	  the	  first	  in	  which	  Shor-­‐McCarty	  data	  is	  available.	  Despite	  a	  lack	  of	  ideological	  data	  from	  previous	  years	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  more	  accurate	  assessment,	  in	  this	  session	  there	  are	  departures	  from	  historic	  trends	  that	  may	  indicate	  possible	  committee-­‐level	  polarization	  and	  strategizing.	  In	  the	  previous	  10	  sessions	  (1975-­‐1994)	  the	  House	  policy	  committee	  was	  comprised	  of	  between	  24	  and	  30	  members,	  averaged	  25.9,	  and	  had	  a	  mean	  of	  26.	  In	  1995	  that	  number	  drops	  to	  22,	  a	  number	  the	  committee	  would	  not	  exceed	  in	  any	  of	  the	  subsequent	  years	  of	  the	  analysis.	  While	  this	  may	  not	  pose	  an	  abnormality	  on	  its	  own,	  this	  also	  occurs	  in	  the	  Senate	  policy	  committee,	  which	  drops	  from	  an	  average	  of	  14.5	  members	  in	  the	  same	  10	  sessions	  to	  only	  10	  members	  in	  1995. 
 
In this session the median polarization between committees and chambers vary 
drastically. The House committees are only .125 - .150 points higher than the House, which, at 
1.549 is the most moderate of the research period. On the other hand, median polarization in the 
Senate committees is between .33 and .39 lower than the chamber’s 1.443. This is one of the 
very few instances of any of the four committees measuring below their given chamber in any of 
the 28 observations.  
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Mean polarization measurements are slightly higher per committee against the chamber. 
Committee homogeneity is also fairly moderate, kept in check by Senate committees closer to 
their mean than the chamber, the only time this would occur for all committees over time. Lastly, 
policy committee chairs are more ideologically aligned with the leaders of their respective 
chamber and thus are more moderate than the House and their committee medians, or more 
liberal than the Senate and their committee medians.  
 
Each of the four committees, all with a DFL-majority, fit most closely with the theory of 
Conditional Party Government, and the health omnibus bill, SF 1110, authored by Sen. D. 
Samuelson (DFL, 12) passes through the House 98-31 and through the Senate 56-11. Moderate 
Republican opposition, approximately 
half in each chamber, can be predicted 
within the theoretical framework. The 
omnibus appropriates the CCDTF 
entitlement grants of $41,230,000 and 
$45,080,000, as well as non-
entitlement grants of $2,100,000 for 
each fiscal year. This is a $19.2 million 
increase over the previous biennium, 
driven by a forecast growth in 
admissions (Fiscal Review, 1997).  
 
Chamber Chamber
   Median Polarization 1.546    Median Polarization 1.443
   Mean Polarization 0.972    Mean Polarization 0.871
   Speaker -0.645    Majority Leader -1.066
   Standard Deviation 0.865    Standard Deviation 0.758
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.331    Majority Standard Dev. 0.407
Policy Committee Policy Committee
   Chair -0.522    Chair -1.152
   Theory: CPG -0.029    Theory: CPG 0.113
   Median Polarization 1.672    Median Polarization 1.053
   Majority Median -0.900    Majority Median -0.907
   Mean Polarization 1.261    Mean Polarization 0.897
   Majority Mean -1.006    Majority Mean -0.944
   Standard Deviation 0.946    Standard Deviation 0.682
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.419    Majority Standard Dev. 0.478
Finance Subcommittee Finance Subcommittee
   Chair -1.556    Chair -0.430
   Theory: CPG -0.015    Theory: CPG -0.029
   Median Polarization 1.693    Median Polarization 1.109
   Majority Median -0.814    Majority Median -0.832
   Mean Polarization 1.310    Mean Polarization 0.974
   Majority Mean -0.944    Majority Mean -0.899
   Standard Deviation 1.017    Standard Deviation 0.741
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.466    Majority Standard Dev. 0.460
SENATE CHAMBERHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Table	  1.	  	  Ideological	  Levels:	  1995-­‐1996	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Treatment provider rates are effectively frozen from January 1, 1995 until December 31, 
1997, which while a cost-saving measure of $4.9 million for the state, it means providers will 
need to bear a larger portion of costs in order to maintain services. This was the first time the 
state had intervened in providers’ rates since the inception of the CCDTF in 1988. Previously 
rates were negotiated between provider and county, upwards of 3% a year, with the state 
providing accordingly. In addition to locking in rates, the bill saves an additional $890,000 by 
not reallocating unspent treatment funds from the CCDTF reserve. 
 
Rep. Greenfield (DFL, 62A), author of the omnibus companion bill in the House also 
authored HF 1442 with Rep. Leppik (IR, 45B) and Rep. Lourey (DFL, 8B). The bill modified 
language regarding the counseling profession, including accreditation, education, and licensure. 
It passed the Senate 61-0 and the House 93-30. In addition, he co-authored with Rep. Cooper 
(DFL, 15B) HF 66, which established a licensing board for certain health providers, including 
chemical dependency. The 1996 omnibus supplemental bill, HF1584, also authored by Rep. 
Greenfield, responds to a downward forecast adjustment by reducing CCDTF appropriations by 
$3,467,000 and $1,346,000, as biennial spending totals $81,497,000. 
 
This first biennium reveals the predicted level of support from a majority party 
historically known to support social services, as well as a moderate level of minority party 
opposition predicted within the CPG framework.  
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1997-1998: 80th legislature    
The 80th legislature sees much more balance between committees and their respective 
chambers in terms of median and mean scores, as well as polarization and homogeneity. The 
median scores for policy, finance, and chambers in both scenarios are remarkably cohesive, with 
the House and finance matching at -0.456 and policy off the chamber by 0.015 at -0.471. 
Meanwhile, the Senate and its committees fall within .05 of each other.  Standard deviation holds 
steady for both as the Senate maintains its tight structure. The cohesion between chambers and 
committees tells us that the Informational theory is at work in all committees. 
 
Median polarization increases 
in the House by .052 yet policy 
polarization decreases by .032, led by 
a more slightly moderate Republican 
membership. House finance jumps in 
median polarization, yet this is 
realistically offset by a decrease in 
mean polarization. Polarization in the 
Senate chamber falls by .083 yet 
policy increases by .402 to 1.455. The 
difference in Senate finance increases 
by slightly more than policy, up .411 to 1.520.  
 
Chamber Chamber
   Median Polarization 1.003    Median Polarization 0.862
   Mean Polarization 1.598    Mean Polarization 1.360
   Speaker -0.992    Majority Leader -1.066
   Standard Deviation 0.892    Standard Deviation 0.751
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.382    Majority Standard Dev. 0.325
Policy Committee Policy Committee
   Chair -0.712    Chair -1.096
   Theory: ILO -0.015    Theory: ILO 0.006
   Median Polarization 1.229    Median Polarization 1.156
   Majority Median -0.838    Majority Median -1.153
   Mean Polarization 1.640    Mean Polarization 1.455
   Majority Mean -0.91    Majority Mean -1.085
   Standard Deviation 0.934    Standard Deviation 0.807
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.382    Majority Standard Dev. 0.325
Finance Subcommittee Finance Subcommittee
   Chair -1.556    Chair -0.430
   Theory: ILO 0    Theory: ILO 0.047
   Median Polarization 1.826    Median Polarization 1.520
   Majority Median -1.024    Majority Median -1.081
   Mean Polarization 1.089    Mean Polarization 1.011
   Majority Mean -0.772    Majority Mean -0.901
   Standard Deviation 0.982    Standard Deviation 0.795
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.465    Majority Standard Dev. 0.550
SENATE CHAMBERHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Table	  2.	  	  Ideological	  Levels:	  1997-­‐1998	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Despite higher levels of polarization in most bodies, the health omnibus bill, SF 1908, 
authored by Sen. Samuelson (DFL, 12) passes along similar lines as that of the previous session, 
with totals 54-12 in the Senate and 112-19 in the House. Appropriations to the CCDTF were 
made in the amounts of $35,643,000 and $37,271,000 for entitlement grants and $4,365,000 each 
fiscal year for non-entitlement grants.  
 
Increasing coverage for treatment with those on other forms of medical assistance 
decreases forecasted appropriations by nearly $19 million. With the mandated freeze on provider 
rates now over, the legislature passes a 3% rate increase, a lower rate than anticipated that saved 
$930,000. An additional $1.5 million is secured for those who are to lose general assistance 
eligibility due to welfare reform. Another $1.3 million goes towards those seeking treatment 
under the new income criteria of below 60% state median income, changes that eliminate the 
family and age requirements. The 1998 omnibus supplemental bill, SF 3346, once again authored 
by Sen. Samuelson, reduced the CCDTF entitlement funds by $7,893,000, and increased non-
entitlement by $400,000.  The bill passed the Senate 64-2 and the House 84-48. 
  
The biennium exists entirely within the Information and Legislative Organizational 
theory, which, along with decrease homogeneity, counterbalances the increase in overall 
polarization in the House. 
 
1999-2000: 81st legislature  
Republicans win control of the Minnesota House in the 1998 election with a majority of 
four seats, whereas the Senate remains under DFL control, as it does for the entirety of this 
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research period. How would a majority party shift affect polarization in the chambers and 
committees?  In terms of House policy median polarization it is a sharp spike up from the 
moderating step down in 1997-1998, climbing from 1.640 to 1.778. Chamber median 
polarization takes a very small step up from 1.598 to 1.607. As can be expected, the median 
ideological score in the House becomes a near mirror opposite of the previous session, with a 
change from -0.471 to .418, and policy and finance of course follow suit.  
  
The party shift barely makes an 
impact on mean polarization for House 
chamber and policy, while finance 
jumps from 1.089 to 1.368. As chair, 
Rep. Goodno (R, 9A) is positioned as a 
moderate in a small yet ideologically 
contrasted committee (Appendix B). 
Rep. Goodno’s omnibus bill is 
discussed below.  
  
 Policy Republican homogeneity is nearly identical to the chamber majority, as can be 
expected within the context of Conditional Party Government. Even more so, the finance 
majority becomes closer to the party leadership, working within the framework of major Party 
Cartel, and drawing up both the median and mean scores within the chamber. Homogeneity in 
the House chamber and policy decrease in both parties, but whereas the DFL maintains an 
Chamber Chamber
   Median Polarization 1.607    Median Polarization 1.368
   Mean Polarization 1.015    Mean Polarization 0.861
   Speaker 0.923    Majority Leader -1.066
   Standard Deviation 0.899    Standard Deviation 0.752
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.238    Majority Standard Dev. 0.384
Policy Committee Policy Committee
   Chair 0.893    Chair -1.096
   Theory: CPG 0.038    Theory: ILO -0.06
   Median Polarization 1.778    Median Polarization 1.356
   Majority Median 0.771    Majority Median -1.007
   Mean Polarization 1.290    Mean Polarization 1.076
   Majority Mean 0.783    Majority Mean -1.026
   Standard Deviation 0.976    Standard Deviation 0.756
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.245    Majority Standard Dev. 0.41
Finance Subcommittee Finance Subcommittee
   Chair 0.609    Chair -0.430
   Theory: MPC -0.047    Theory: ILO* 0.211
   Median Polarization 1.953    Median Polarization 1.520
   Majority Median 0.875    Majority Median -1.153
   Mean Polarization 1.368    Mean Polarization 1.100
   Majority Mean 0.856    Majority Mean -1.021
   Standard Deviation 1.037    Standard Deviation 0.810
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.242    Majority Standard Dev. 0.436
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approximate distance between the two bodies, the Republicans in the both cases draw even. Still, 
the Republicans are more homogeneous in all scenarios. 
  
Rep. Goodno’s omnibus bill, HF 2699, appropriates $36,751,000 and $38,847,000 for 
entitlement recipients, and $6,778,000 and $6,328,000 for non-entitlements. Reflecting upon the 
previous two sessions, this appropriation is above the rate inflation from 1997 and 1998, yet well 
below the rates accrued from 1995 onward. I would be remiss not to mention the non-entitlement 
appropriations are the largest ever dedicated to the “working poor” demographic in the history of 
the CCDTF. Rep. Goodno’s bill faces the same fate in the House as the previous three, passing 
along similar lines at 110-21, while the Senate was all but unanimous at 64-1. Resistance to the 
Republican bill is largely from fellow House Republicans. 
 
The lower level of polarization successfully predicts a bi-partisan effort within the 
Senate, while the House opposition is revealed through the decreased homogeneity of both the 
policy committee and the chamber, despite the effect of the CPG framework.  
 
2001-2002: 82nd legislature   The	  82nd	  legislature	  is	  the	  start	  of	  three	  seeming	  unpredictable	  sessions,	  and	  the	  session	  has	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  surprises.	  Leadership	  scores	  remain	  intact	  from	  the	  previous	  session,	  and	  the	  House	  and	  Senate	  chambers	  maintain	  their	  levels	  of	  polarization	  and	  homogeneity.	  It	  is	  within	  committees	  that	  fluctuations	  arise,	  as	  opposite	  parties	  behave	  in	  similar	  fashion	  yet	  in	  different	  committees.	  The	  DFL	  minority’s	  standard	  deviation,	  mean,	  and	  median	  measures	  all	  rise	  in	  the	  House	  policy	  committee	  facilitating	  a	  decrease	  in	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  overall	  committee	  median	  polarization	  to	  1.635,	  the	  second	  lowest	  level	  of	  median	  polarization	  in	  the	  period.	  The	  DFL	  also	  pulls	  down	  polarization	  in	  finance	  with	  a	  more	  moderate	  membership.	  The	  Republican	  majority	  median	  in	  both	  committees	  remains	  level	  form	  the	  previous	  session.	  
 
Median polarization within the Senate, however, reaches its highest level in any session, 
increasing by .480 to 1.882. The Republican policy median increases by .413 to .673, and by 
0.307 to 0.609 in finance. The DFL majority median falls slightly in both committees, pushing 
levels even higher. Committee membership is also surprisingly low, and while House policy 
plummets to 16 members for a 25-year low, Senate policy initiates its own series of unusually 
low committee memberships (Appendix A).  
 
Amidst all of this ideological commotion, data shows the DFL to be operating yet again 
within the Informational framework, 
reflecting the overall chamber, 
regardless of party. The legislature 
passes SF 4 through Senate 61-0, and 
then through the House 122-9, the 
lowest amount of resistance to an 
omnibus bill thus far in the years under 
observation. Senator Berglin (DFL, 
61) authored SF 4, which appropriates 
over $10 million more in CCDTF 
Chamber Chamber
   Median Polarization 1.607    Median Polarization 1.368
   Mean Polarization 1.031    Mean Polarization 0.861
   Speaker 0.923    Majority Leader -1.066
   Standard Deviation 0.913    Standard Deviation 0.752
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.236    Majority Standard Dev. 0.384
Policy Committee Policy Committee
   Chair 0.893    Chair -1.096
   Theory: MPC 0.057    Theory: ILO -0.06
   Median Polarization 1.640    Median Polarization 1.356
   Majority Median 0.771    Majority Median -1.007
   Mean Polarization 1.266    Mean Polarization 1.076
   Majority Mean 0.780    Majority Mean -1.026
   Standard Deviation 0.985    Standard Deviation 0.756
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.221    Majority Standard Dev. 0.41
Finance Subcommittee Finance Subcommittee
   Chair 0.609    Chair -1.512
   Theory: MPC -0.047    Theory: ILO 0.028
   Median Polarization 1.926    Median Polarization 1.818
   Majority Median 0.875    Majority Median -1.209
   Mean Polarization 1.266    Mean Polarization 1.200
   Majority Mean 0.839    Majority Mean -1.081
   Standard Deviation 0.956    Standard Deviation 0.880
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.269    Majority Standard Dev. 0.467
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funds than the previous bill: $41,200,000 and $43,811,000 in entitlement grants; $5,158,000 and 
$6,094,000 in non-entitlement grants; and a creates s savings of $2 million by reallocation of 
federal chemical dependency grants for non-entitlement purposes.  
 
The omnibus bill modifies the Tier II non-entitlement language in Minnesota Statute 
254B.09 by eliminating old eligibility criteria based on state median income and making it 
consistent with federal poverty guidelines (FPG), thereby increasing access to CCDTF 
assistance. Previously, an individual with a family income less than 60% state median income 
qualified for “Tier II” non-entitlement grants, and individuals whose family income was between 
60%-115% qualified for “Tier III.” Both received money only after all other qualified individuals 
had received service. SF 4 changed this to Tier II falling under 215% of FPG, and Tier III as 
between 215%-412% FPG, and eligible individuals would receive money from a dedicated 
source into which the state would appropriate as per the regular cycle. While this passed in good 
faith and was soundly funded in the bill, its longevity will soon be compromised.  
 
The passage unanimous passage in the Senate of Senator Berglin’s SF 4, in addition to 
the all but unanimous passage in the House, suggests two things: that a strong majority operating 
under ILO can produce a bill that can withstand polarization in the origination chamber; and a 
philosophically strong opposition in the House 
 
2003-2004: 83rd legislature  
Republican victories in the 2002 election give the party their largest majority since 1967 
and help create an outstanding increase in median polarization in the House at 1.741, the peak of 
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polarization of the seven biennia. The chamber also experiences its highest median score of the 
period at 0.515 while policy and finance fall slightly from highs of the previous session. There is 
a five-seat Republican policy majority yet the median party score continues to trend downward 
from its high in 1995 to .733; the first and only time the committee scores below the chamber. 
This indicates that the more effective result of the 2002 election was the reduction of moderate 
DFL members, as House Republicans membership grows in by 13 in 2003 yet the median score 
increases by only .006 over the previous session. On the other hand, despite their losses the DFL 
experiences its strongest partisan rankings as the median plummets from -0.864 to -1.097 in 
policy and from -0.874 to -0.002 in the chamber.  
 
Senate median polarization of level 1.404 continues an upward trend since 1999, and 
policy remains very high at 1.864. 
Senate policy polarization is driven 
record low median ideology at -1.107, 
even while the chamber increases to -
0.554 and finance almost twice as 
moderate as the previous year at -
0.364.  Senate Republicans have now 
logged four consecutive session of 
increased partisanship with the 
chamber at 0.609 and the policy 
membership just above at 0.655. 
 
Chamber Chamber
   Median Polarization 1.741    Median Polarization 1.404
   Mean Polarization 1.041    Mean Polarization 0.953
   Speaker 0.923    Majority Leader -0.608
   Standard Deviation 0.931    Standard Deviation 0.834
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.291    Majority Standard Dev. 0.365
Policy Committee Policy Committee
   Chair 0.861    Chair -1.209
   Theory: CPG 0.006    Theory: CPG -0.414
   Median Polarization 1.830    Median Polarization 1.864
   Majority Median 0.733    Majority Median -1.209
   Mean Polarization 1.323    Mean Polarization 1.422
   Majority Mean 0.722    Majority Mean -1.265
   Standard Deviation 0.979    Standard Deviation 1.063
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.239    Majority Standard Dev. 0.177
Finance Subcommittee Finance Subcommittee
   Chair 0.821    Chair -1.512
   Theory: MPC 0.01    Theory: ILO 0.19
   Median Polarization 1.555    Median Polarization 1.687
   Majority Median 0.821    Majority Median -1.209
   Mean Polarization 1.153    Mean Polarization 1.315
   Majority Mean 0.768    Majority Mean -1.182
   Standard Deviation 0.893    Standard Deviation 0.996
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.272    Majority Standard Dev. 0.280
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The majority party ideological data places this session well within the scope of the CPG 
framework. It is in fact as close as the 1997 DFL-controlled Senate policy committee was to the 
ILO theory. The divisions exhibited in the figures above and in the appendices are also very 
apparent in the legislation proposed and the clear lines drawn in the vote totals. The session’s 
second omnibus bill, HF 6, Rep. Bradley (R, 29B), reduces the original entitlement appropriation 
in the regular session’s omnibus bill by $18 million.  In the previous session the criteria for non-
entitlement were expanded, yet HF 6 completely eliminates Tier III funding for individuals with 
incomes over 215% FPG, saving $5 million, and effectively eliminates Tier II funding by 
reducing the appropriations $12 million in 2001-02 to $2.1 million in 2003-04 and moving 
forward. Tier II and III funding was predominantly used by employed men, but ancillary 
programs for women as well as youth-oriented programs are also be cut, saving an additional $5 
million. Finally, the reduction of 1% to provider rates saves $933,000. 
  
HF 6 eliminated nearly $21 million from a steadily growing and well-received CD 
treatment service. What it put in its place was $49,254,000 and $50,337,000 respectively into 
Tier I funding, after inflation accounting to $7 million over the previous session, thereby setting 
a trend for future legislation to focus on the bottom tier of eligibility only. As may be expected 
by a bill created within the Major Party Cartel framework, HF 6 received partisan support, with a 
final vote of 78-54 (the Republicans with a 81-53 House majority at the time of passage), and 
much the same in the Senate where it passed on 34-28 (the DFL having a weak 35-31 majority). 
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The biennium shows how the right combination of factors can yield desired effect, which 
in this case is the fiscal restraint of the CCDTF by the majority party. When such factors work in 
conjunction for the majority party, the minority does not have the leverage for defeat.  
 
2005-2006: 84th legislature   
The ideological data reveals a transition for the Republican Party, and to some extent a 
realignment of the DFL after the previous biennium. In the Senate the median polarization ticks 
up by 0.042, pushed almost entirely by the Republican minority, who climb by 0.034, whereas 
the DFL remain all but flat moving +0.06. The Senate chamber median score remains level at 
0.554, as does policy at -1.107. The median scores, and hence median polarization remain 
identical to the previous session in Senate finance despite a loss of two minority members. 
 
The House chamber median 
score falls much more rapidly than 
policy, from .515 to -0.216, with the 
latter from .525 to 0.025. Median 
polarization takes a similar trend, with 
the chamber falling from 1.741 to 
1.653, and policy from 1.830 to 1.793. 
While policy’s level is still high, it 
seems a drastic change from the 
meteoric rise between 2001 and 2003. 
In addition, homogeneity in House 
Chamber Chamber
   Median Polarization 1.653    Median Polarization 1.446
   Mean Polarization 1.049    Mean Polarization 0.979
   Speaker 0.923    Majority Leader -0.608
   Standard Deviation 0.923    Standard Deviation 0.923
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.259    Majority Standard Dev. 0.394
Policy Committee Policy Committee
   Chair 0.821    Chair -1.209
   Theory: MPC -0.044    Theory: CPG -0.408
   Median Polarization 1.793    Median Polarization 1.846
   Majority Median 0.881    Majority Median -1.203
   Mean Polarization 1.412    Mean Polarization 1.411
   Majority Mean 0.894    Majority Mean -1.253
   Standard Deviation 1.094    Standard Deviation 1.037
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.307    Majority Standard Dev. 0.161
Finance Subcommittee Finance Subcommittee
   Chair -    Chair -1.512
   Theory: MPC -    Theory: ILO 0.382
   Median Polarization -    Median Polarization 1.687
   Majority Median -    Majority Median -1.209
   Mean Polarization -    Mean Polarization 1.365
   Majority Mean -    Majority Mean -1.182
   Standard Deviation -    Standard Deviation 1.024
   Majority Standard Dev. -    Majority Standard Dev. 0.280
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policy diminishes in the biennium.  Amidst the leveling and diminishing polarization, the 
Republican majority increases their median score by 0.161 to 0.894. The policy committee 
conducted all fiscal business for the biennium. 
 
HF 139, with bipartisan authors of Rep, Bradley and Rep. Huntley (DFL, 7A), offers no 
surprises and passes the Senate 60-6, and the House 88-40 with bipartisan support. It is in mix of 
political factors that seem to bring balance to the Major Party Cartel framework in which HF 139 
was created: reduced polarization; increased homogeneity; and a near-balanced membership in 
both chambers. Appropriations for CCDTF are $63,183,000 and $68,744,000, yet non-
entitlement remains essentially unfunded at $1,055,000 per year. Provider rates are frozen once 
more in 2005 and then will go unrestricted for 2006. Lastly, in order to better handle the growing 
methamphetamine problem in Minnesota, the bill sets aside $600,000 for an evidence-based 
methamphetamine treatment program at the Willmar Regional Treatment Center. 
 
2007-2008: 85th legislature  
Observations in this final biennium are in much finer context than at the onset. With the 
DFL winning back control of the House in 2006, all median scores in the House are nestled 
closely together and below 1995 levels: chamber, -0.650; policy, -0.669; and finance, -0.659. 
Median polarization level in the chamber is 1.592, policy is below 1995 levels at 1.616, and 
finance is at 1.651. House Republicans have moderated to 0.648 in the chamber, and 0.716 in 
policy, both constituting very sharp drops, and at least in policy that the 2005 spike may have 
been an outlier. The House policy DFL median score has also become relatively moderate at -
0.900, and homogeneity has returned to previous levels, falling 0.409. 
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Throughout the observation the Senate chamber median polarization only fluctuated 0.09 
points, now resting at 1.416. Concurrently the chamber median score saw just as little movement, 
and it has settled just below its 1995 starting point. Within the policy committee the Republicans 
fortified over time by 0.425 points and now perch at .699. The DFL median is making its way 
back to the moderate stand it took at the beginning, helping to create the lowest level of median 
polarization in finance, 1.128, since 1995. 
  
 With all committees operating within the Informational framework, it is appropriate to 
expect a health bill that would serve their jurisdictions properly. Rep. Huntley’s HF 1078 would 
pass, yet it would do so along strong party lines: 95-38 in the House (85-49 DFL majority); and 
43-23 in the Senate (44-23 DFL 
majority.) The Republican minority 
within House policy proves far more 
partisan than their DFL counterparts, 
with even six of seven committee 
members voting in opposition in the 
chamber (Rep Abeler is the only vote 
in favor.) The bill appropriates the 
most generous amount to date to the 
CCDTF, $78,225,000 and $88,957,000 
for Tier I, and Tier II continues at 
levels set in 2003. 
Chamber Chamber
   Median Polarization 1.592    Median Polarization 1.446
   Mean Polarization 0.983    Mean Polarization 0.979
   Speaker -1.501    Majority Leader -0.608
   Standard Deviation 0.873    Standard Deviation 0.923
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.345    Majority Standard Dev. 0.394
Policy Committee Policy Committee
   Chair -1.259    Chair -1.209
   Theory: ILO -0.019    Theory: ILO -0.026
   Median Polarization 1.616    Median Polarization 1.846
   Majority Median -0.900    Majority Median -1.203
   Mean Polarization 1.300    Mean Polarization 1.411
   Majority Mean -1.006    Majority Mean -1.253
   Standard Deviation 1.009    Standard Deviation 1.037
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.409    Majority Standard Dev. 0.161
Finance Subcommittee Finance Subcommittee
   Chair -1.221    Chair -1.512
   Theory: ILO -0.009    Theory: ILO 0.036
   Median Polarization 1.651    Median Polarization 1.687
   Majority Median -0.931    Majority Median -1.209
   Mean Polarization 1.243    Mean Polarization 1.365
   Majority Mean -0.984    Majority Mean -1.182
   Standard Deviation 0.931    Standard Deviation 1.024
   Majority Standard Dev. 0.406    Majority Standard Dev. 0.280
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 The 2007-2008 biennium ends the research period much as it began. There is strong 
support for treatment in a majority party historically known for such effort. Levels of 
polarization are relatively low, especially in the House, which produces the beneficial bill.  
Again, there is  a strong number of factors acting in concert against potential detractors. 
Results and Considerations 
 There is considerable effort toward resolving the multitude of challenges that arise 
surrounding chemical dependency. The amount of scholarship regarding how and why we 
experiment with substances to begin with, whether we become dependent or addicted, and 
whether we succeed at treatment is staggering, yet the focus on treatment remains on the 
mechanisms and factors in place near the end of the process: willingness to change, quality of 
counselor or facility, or adequate recovery environment, for example. The intent of my research 
is to propose a novel way of viewing the challenges that confound our system: to look much 
further back along the process, back to its political origins. 
 
 By observing the historical context of the laws that have come to shape our current 
system, we can see there had been considerable bi-partisan effort during the drafting and passage 
of the legislation that would be seen as pioneering in the field of treatment; decriminalization of 
public intoxication; establishment of county-based treatment centers; and innovation in funding 
through the Consolidated Chemical Dependency Treatment Fund. For every decade there were 
strides forward in improving access, funding, and levels of care. My research of the legislative 
sessions between 1995-2008 reveals a seeming more volatile environment for the creation of 
stable and sustainable treatment policy. 
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 Throughout my research I examine the climate through numerous lenses to collect as 
robust a perspective as possible. I use all available Shor-McCarty ideological data for Minnesota 
from 1995-2008 to build ideological databases for the House of Representatives as well as its 
Health and Human Services policy committee and finance subcommittee. I then do the same for 
the Senate, thereby allowing dozens of techniques for observation. I calculate median (mid-
point) polarization trends for each body over time for familiarity and ease of use. In addition, I 
verify these trends by the creating mean-based (average) polarization trends for each body over 
time. Next, calculating the standard deviation from the mean for each body over time checks 
homogeneity, the standard measure of cohesion and autonomy. 
 
 These measures reveal the inter- and intra-party dynamics of a given session, and 
together offer a splendid examination of partisanship. Yet, I need to know more about the 
decision making process for each session. I use three varying theoretical frameworks regarding 
committee and party behavior and strategy. Krehbiel’s (1991) Information and Legislative 
Organization theory shows how committees, when comprised of knowledgeable and/or 
experienced members, creates legislation that is beneficial for the jurisdiction of the committee 
and/or for the legislature as a whole. Narrowing this perspective slightly there is the theory of 
Rohde’s (1991) Conditional Party Government, which claims that through committee 
appointment the majority party can draft and pass legislation only upon consensus of the party, 
and that party leaders will not attempt to prohibit passage of said legislation. An even more 
partisan perspective on the potential function of committees is that of Cox and McCubbins 
(1993) Major Party Cartel in which the majority party leadership strategizes a legislative agenda 
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most beneficial to the needs of the leadership and uses its power of committee appointment to sit 
those who are most willing to satisfy said agenda. 
 
 By applying committee member ideological data into each of these three frameworks and 
identifying that which gives greatest cohesion I ascertain the overall desired strategy or method 
of decision making within a committee, chamber, and session. My research shows the 
Informational theory to be most widely used, yet only by the DFL-majority, in fourteen of 
twenty committees, or seventy percent. The Conditional Party Government theory applied to six 
of twenty DFL committees (thirty percent) and two of seven Republican committees (thirty 
percent). The Major Party Cartel theory, while never used by the DFL, was favored by 
Republicans in five of seven committees, for seventy percent. Hence, Conditional Party 
Government theory was either for more partisan (DFL) or more moderate (Republicans) 
environments. 
 
 My research reveals that individually none of either the ideological measures or 
theoretical frameworks is strong enough to define any given climate. Certainly, polarization is 
more clearly understood within the appropriate frame, and verification of any theory is only truly 
complete with accompanying ideological data. Not only do they support themselves, they can 
and will in conjunction nullify the properties of another, whereas an applicable framework can 
be dismantled if polarization and standard deviation override the effect.  
  
What does this bear on CD treatment in Minnesota? Legislatively speaking the most 
pivotal moment in the period is that of the passage of HF 6 in 2003. Many in the counseling 
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profession feel the elimination of Tier III funding, women’s ancillary services, and youth-
oriented programs, along with the effective defunding of Tier II have had the most impact on 
treatment services in Minnesota. Looking to the political elements leading to the bills passage we 
can see the following: both extremely high median polarization and scores in both House and 
Senate, lower levels of cohesion among the DFL minority, and a large Republican majority 
operating under the Conditional Party Government and Major Party Cartel frameworks. In other 
sessions there are enough elements to offset dominant theories, yet in 2003 there are not. To 
follow the trends over time is to witness a great climax within this very session, and an easing of 
tensions afterward. 
 
 While this thesis does not contend to offer any type of definitive answer to the challenges 
of CD treatment, it does offer a fresh means of understanding the climate in which stable policy 
can thrive, and that in which it cannot. Future considerations for those who both advocate for 
stable policy and those who create it are to observe and promote a healthy committee 
environment. The research shows the current tendency for strides ahead followed by hesitation 
and reluctance. The rich history of chemical dependency treatment in Minnesota is one of 
bipartisan agreement and progress, initiated by those who understand the vast costs of addiction 
and the incredible benefits of treatment. The results of my investigations shows that yes, there is 
truly a political origin to the system of treatment, and just as the environment for recovery is 
essential to its success, such is true for the creation of stable and sustainable legislation that 
drives said treatment.  
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Appendix A: Minnesota House of Representatives 
Figure 1. Median Polarization by Body: House of Representatives 
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Figure 2. Median Ideological Score by Body: House of Representatives 
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Figure 3. House Republican Median Ideological Score by Body 
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Figure 4. House DFL Median Ideological Score by Body 
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Figure 5. Mean Polarization by Body: House of Representatives 
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Figure 6. Mean Ideological Score by Body: House of Representatives 	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Figure 7. House Republican Mean Ideological Score by Body 	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Figure 8. House DFL Mean Ideological Score by Body 	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Figure 9. Standard Deviation by Body: House of Representatives 	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Figure 10. House Republican Standard Deviation by Body 	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Figure 11. House DFL Standard Deviation by Body 	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Figure 12. Total Legislative Theory Application by Party 	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Appendix B: Minnesota Senate 
Figure 13. Median Polarization by Body: Senate 	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Figure 14. Median Ideological Score by Body: Senate 	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Figure 15. Senate Republican Median Ideological Score 	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Figure 16. Senate DFL Median Ideological Score by Body 	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Figure 17. Mean Polarization by Body: Senate 
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Figure 18. Mean Ideological Score by Body: Senate 	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Figure 19. Senate Republican Mean Ideological Score by Body 	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Figure 20. Senate DFL Mean Ideological Score by Body 	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Figure 21. Standard Deviation by Body: Senate 	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Figure 22. Senate Republican Standard Deviation By Body 	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Figure 23. Senate DFL Standard Deviation by Body 	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